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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WALTER WALLIS and MARLEEN
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs Respondents,

vs.
H. E. THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL
EQUITIES, INC., NATIONAL
FUND, INC., and AMERICAN
SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION,

Case No. 17051

Defendants Appellants.

WALTER WALLIS and MARLEEN
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs Respondents,

vs.
H. E. THOMAS, INTERNATIONAL
EQUITIES, INC., NATIONAL
FUND, INC., AMERICAN SAVINGS
& LOAN ASSOCIATION, and GLEN
JUSTICE MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC.,
Defendants Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS AND
CROSS-APPELLANTS, WALTER WALLIS
AND MARLEEN WALLIS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-respondents initiated this action against
defendants-appellants, alleging fraud and violation of the Utah
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, Section 57-11-1 et seq., Utah
Code Annotated.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Peter F. Leary
on December 13, 1977. Judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs on May 31, 1979 on the basis of fraud.

On August 20,

1979 Judge Leary granted defendants a new trial.
A second trial was held before the Honorable G. Hal
Taylor on March 5, 1980.

Judgment was thereafter entered in

favor of plaintiffs on their claims under the Utah Uniform Land
Sales Practices Act.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents pray that the judgment of the District
Court from the second trial be affirmed and that respondents be
awarded their attorney's fee on this appeal.
In the alternative, and as a cross-appeal, respondents
pray that the judgment of the District Court from the first
trial be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In July, 1975, plaintiffs owned a home in Salt Lake
County, Utah constructed on Lot 31, Montana Ranchos Subdivision, having a street address of 9327 Maison Drive.

There were

two mortgage loans on the property neither of which was then
current.

Plaintiffs were under the impression that the prop-

erty was going to be sold because of the two mortgage delinquencies. Plaintiffs were attempting to sell the property and
had listed it for sale (R. 557-58).
(2)
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Plaintiffs responded to a newspaper advertisement
placed by defendant International Equities, Inc., that it
bought equities in homes, cash for equities (R. 558).

After

the home was first inspected by an employee of International
Equities, Inc., defendant H. E. Thomas, president of defendant
International Equities, Inc. met with Mrs. Wallis at the home
(R. 559).

Defendant Thomas met with plaintiffs at their home

the following evening.
The facts as determined by the trial court at the second trial sufficiently, accurately and properly state the facts
of this case:
1.

Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County,

State of Utah.
2.

At all pertinent times herein, defendant H. E.

Thomas was a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
Defendant International Equities, Inc. had a place of business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and H. E. Thomas
was the president of said International Equities, Inc.
3.

On or about the 8th day of July, 1975, plaintiffs

and defendant International Equities, Ince discussed, negotiated and thereafter entered into certain agreements (Exhibits 14-P and 2-P) whereby plaintiffs would convey their
home and real property located 9327 Maison Drive, Sandy,
Utah, in exchange for defendant International Equities,
Inc. assuming a first and second mortgage on said real
property, and defendant International Equities, Inc. also
conveying to plaintiff 10 acres of land located in Iron
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(3)

County, Utah,

("the Iron County property", more particu-

larly described in paragraph 8{d)).

On July 8, 1975,

plaintiffs conveyed to International Equities, Inc. their
home at 9327 Maison Drive, Sandy, Utah and International
Equities, Inc. conveyed the Iron County property to plaintiffse
4e

In connection with the real property located in

Iron County, Utah, which defendant International Equities,
Inc. conveyed to plaintiffs, defendant H. E. Thomas individually and on behalf of International Equities, Inc. made
certain representations concerning said real property.
Said defendant, in the stated capacities, represented to
plaintiffs that the real property was located within five
minutes drive from Brian Head Ski Resort, that the property
is contigious to agricultural property under cultivation,
that the property is worth $15,000 ($1,500 per acre), that
said property is within one mile of utilities, water and
other services, and that a subdivision is being developed
equivalent to the Bell Canyon Acres Development in Salt
Lake County, that streets were in, and that white fencing
was being placed on lots in the subdivision.
5.

Each of the representations in the foregoing para-

graph 4 involved a material fact concerning said real property and was false.

The property is not located within 5

minutes drive from Brian Head Ski Resort.
not contigiuous to agricultural property
tion.

The property is
unde~

cultiva-

The property is not worth $15,000 ($1,500 per acre).
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(4)

The property is not within one mile of utilities, water and
other services.

Streets are not in and white fencing is

not being placed on lots in the subdivision.
6.

Defendant H. E. Thomas, individually and on behalf

of International Equities, Inc., also delivered to plaintiffs a plat or subdivision map, Exhibit 5-P.

Said defen-

dant showed plaintiffs the location of the two lots plaintiffs were to receive, as well as the other lots in the
subdivision, namely lots 1 through 192.

Defendants showed

plaintiffs the location of the lots plantiffs were to receive on Cedar Avenue.

Defendant described lots 10-15,

34-39, 154-159, and 178-183 as being reserved for commercial purposes.
7o

International Equities, Inc. acquired 300 acres of

property in Section 7, Township 33 South, Range 14 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Iron County, Utah in 1973.
8.

Defendant International Equities, Inc. made the

following conveyances of portions of the 300 acres referred
to in the previous paragraph:
(a)

Warranty Deed to Terre Corpo, April 23, 1975, recorded
April 29, 1975, in Book 206, page 65.

(b)

Warranty Deed to Jon McGowan and Associates, January
31, 1975, recorded in Book 205, page 90.

(c)

warranty Deed to National Fund, Inc. dated April 17,
1975, recorded April 29, 1975, in Book 206, page 66.

(d)

warranty Deed to Walter Thomas Wallis and Marleen Kay
Wallis, dated July 8, 1975, recorded July 23, 1975 in
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(5)

Book 209, page 99: Northeast 1/4 of Southwest 1/4 of
Southwest 1/4 of Section 7, Township 33 South, Range
14 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, excepting therefrom all oil and mineral rights from said land as
previously reserved and/or conveyed.
9.

H. E. Thomas directly controlled International

Equities, Inc. at all material times herein, and said H. E.
Thomas materially aided in the disposition of the Iron
County property to the plaintiffs.
10.

The property referred to in paragraph 7 and owned

by International Equities, Inc., and shown to plaintiffs as

a subdivision of 192 lots, was proposed by International
Equities, Inc. to be divided for the purposes of disposition into ten or more units.
11.

Defendants did not register the subdivided lands

pursuant to the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act,
57-11-1 et seq.

Defendants did not deliver a current pub-

lic offering statement to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs did not

give defendants a receipt for a public offering statement.
12.

Defendants H. E. Thomas and International Equi-

ties, Inc. both participated in, promoted and received the
benefits resulting from the misrepresentations made to
plaintiffs.
13.

The consideration paid by plaintiffs for the

subdivided lands was the value of their home on July 8,
1975, $66,495.88, less the amount of the mortgages assumed
by the defendant International Equities, Inc. of
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(6)

$51,495.88.

Such difference is the amount of $15,000 and

is the amount of plaintiffs' damage, for which defendants
are jointly and severally liable.

Plaintiffs paid no prop-

erty taxes on the Iron County property.

Plaintiffs re-

ceived no income from the Iron County property.
14.

Plaintiffs have incurred a reasonable attorney's

fee in the sum of $5,000.
15.

Plaintiffs made tender of reconveyance by appro-

priate instrument prior to entry of judgment.
16.

Plaintiffs waived their claims with respect to

their Third Cause of Action.

In view of the Court's find-

ings regarding the First Cause of Action, the Court makes
no findings regarding plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action.
The record clearly and adequately supports the foregoing Findings of Fact.

The defendant's Iron County property

was proposed by defendants to be a subdivision and was so
represented to plaintiffs (R. 562, 567, 570-571, 613, 644, 689,
690, 693, 698).

Defendants suggest that misrepresentations made by
defendant Thomas are unimportant because the controlling issue
is whether the Iron County property conveyed by defendants to
plaintiffs were "subdivided lands" or "subdivision" within the
meaning of the Utah Uniform Land Sale Practices Act.

Defen-

dants acknowledge that the Iron County property was not registered and that no public offering statement was given to plaintiffs (Appellant's Brief, pp. 4 and 5).

Therefore, plaintiffs

make no references in this brief to support other Findings of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the District Court in responding to Appellants' Brief.

Fur-

ther, the statements contained in points 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of
Appellants' Statement of Facts are irrelevant.
The District Court made Conclusions of of Law supported by the foregoing Facts and the evidence in the case:
1.

The property referred to in Finding number 7, a

portion of which was conveyed by defendants to plaintiffs,
is a "subdivision" or "subdivided land" within the meaning
of Section 57-11-2(6), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.
2.

The offer of defendant International Equities,

Inc. of the real property located in Iron County, Utah, and
the conveyance by said defendants of said real property is
in violation of Section 57-11-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as
amended.
3.

Defendants made untrue statements of material

facts in disposing of the subdivided lands to plaintiffs,
in violation of Section 57-11-17(1) (b), Utah Code Ann., as
amended.
4.

Defendant H. E. Thomas effected the transactions

referred to herein on behalf of International Equities,
Inc. and otherwise materially aided in the disposition of
the subdivided lands to plaintiffs.
5.

In accordance with the provisions of the Land

Sales Practices Act, plaintiffs are entitled to recover
from defendants the difference between the mortgages assumed by defendant International Equities, Inc., $51,495.88,
and the value of their home located at 9327 Maison Drive,
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(8)

Sandy, Utah, $66,495.88, or $15,000, together with interest
at the rate of seven percent per annum from July 8, 1975,
to the date of judgment, which amount is $4,947.95 to March
24, 1980, and $2.88 per day thereafter to the date of entry
of judgment, and reasonable attorney's fees in the amount
of $5,000.
6.

Defendant International Equities, Inc. is entitled

to recover the Iron County property, subject to real estate
taxes and other assessments which may have been assessed
against the Iron County property since.July 8, 1975.
7.

Plaintiffs are entitled to their costs herein.

8.

Plaintiffs' Third Cause of Action should be dis-

missed with prejudice.

Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action

should be dismissed without prejudice.
In connection with the first trial of this matter,
following entry of judgment in favor of plaintiffs, defendants
moved for a new trial on June 2, 1979e

After hearing on the

motion was held on July 9, 1979, plaintiffs filed a Motion to
Amend and Enter Judgment (R. 179-80), dated August 9, 1980.
order granting a new trial was entered on August 20, 1979.
Plaintiffs filed a Petition for Interlocutory Appeal, No.
16682, which Petition was denied.

A copy of the Motion for a

New Trial (R. 171-3), the Motion to Amend and Enter Judgment
(R. 179-80) and the Order Granting a New Trial (R. 184-5) are
attached hereto in the Appendix as Exhibits A, B, and C, respectively.
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(9)

An

Plaintiff's cross-appeal from the Court's Order Granting a New Trial for the following reasons:
1.

Defendant's motion for a new trial and the affi-

davit which formed a part thereof did not raise any of the
grounds required by Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2.

The Court's order granting a new trial did not

refer to or come within any of the grounds identified in
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
3.

There was no properly identified basis for a new

trial and the order granting a new trial was therefore
erronous as a matter of law.
4.

The Court abused its discretion in granting the

motion for a new trial.
5.

There was no showing of evidence either in the

motion or the order granting a new trial from which it
would appear there was at least a reasonable likelihood
that a new trial would affect the result.
6.

The punitive damages awarded by the trial Court

were proper and did not constitute reversable error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DEFENDANTS CONVEYED TO PLAINTIFFS AN INTEREST IN
SUBDIVIDED LANDS LOCATED IN THE STATE OF UTAH, IN
VIOLATION OF THE UTAH UNIFORM LAND SALES PRACTICES ACT.
The Utah Land Sales Practices Act ("Act"), Section

57-11-1, et seq. Utah Code Annotated, as amended (U.C.A.) defines "subdivision" and "subdivided lands" as "any land which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is divided or is proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into ten or more units

"

Section 57-11-2(6)

u.c.A.
Section 57-11-5 of the Act provides that unless the
subdivided lands are otherwise exempt:
(1) No person shall offer or dispose of any interest
in subdivided lands located in this state . • • prior to
the time the subdivided lands are registered in accordance
with this Act;
(2) No person may dispose of any interest in subdivided lands unless an effective current public offering
statement is delivered to the purchaser and the purchaser
is afforded a reasonable opportunity, not to be less than
48 hours, to examine the public offering statement prior to
his signing the contract or agreement of disposition • . • ;
and
(3) No person shall dispose of any interest in subdivided lands without first requiring a dated, signed receipt for the public offering statement in a form to be
approved by the division, from each purchaser •
e

•

The issue presented by defendants' appeal is whether
the Iron County property conveyed to plaintiffs was an interest
in "subdivided lands" or a "subdivision" as defined in the Act.
The rules of appellate review require this Court to
review the evidence in the light most favorable to the successful party at the trial court.
P.2d 708 (Utah 1977).

Carnasecca v. Carnasecca, 572

The reviewing court must sustain the

trial court even if the reviewing court might have come to a
different decision had it been trying the matter.

Wash-A-

Matic, Inc. v. Rupp, 532 P.2d 682 (Utah 1975), Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U.2d 389, 360 P.2d 176 (1961).

Where the trial

court's findings and judgment are based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence, the Supreme Court will not disturb
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(11)

such findings.

Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393 (Utah 1977) •

Furthermore, the Supreme Court is constrained to look at the
whole of the evidence in the light favorable to the trial
court's findings, including any fair inferences to be drawn
from the evidence in all of the circumstances shown; the trial
court's findings shall not be disturbed unless the evidence is
such that all reasonable minds would be persuaded to the contrary.

Hanover Ltd v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), How-

arth v. Osergaard, 30 U.2d 183, 515 P.2d 442 (1973), DelPorto
v. Nicholo, 27 U.2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972).
The trial court found that the defendants delivered to
plaintiffs a plat or subdivision map, Exhibit 5-P (a copy of
which is attached in the Appendix as Exhibit D), which was represented by defendants to show the property conveyed to plaintiffs and concerning which property and subdivision map defendants made certain representations.

The defendants represented

that streets and lots were located as shown on the subdivision
map.

The defendants showed plaintiffs the location of the two

lots plaintiffs were to receive as well as the other lots in
the subdivision, namely lots 1 through-192.

The defendants

showed the plaintiffs the location of the lots plaintiffs were
to receive on Cedar Avenue and the defendants described lots
10-15, 34-39, 154-159 and 178-183 as being reserved for commercial purposes (Finding of Fact No. 6, R. 229).

The trial court

found that the property owned by International Equities, Inc.
in Iron County from which plaintiffs were to receive ten acres,
was shown to plaintiffs as a subdivision of 192 lots and was
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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( 12)

proposed by International Equities, Inc. to be divided for the
purpose of disposition into ten or more units.

The trial court

found that the defendants did not register the subdivided lands
pursuant to the Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act, that
defendants did not deliver a current public offering statement
to plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs did not give defendants a
receipt for a public offering statement.

The trial court found

that defendants H. E. Thomas and International Equities, Inc.
both participated in and received the benefits resulting from
the misrepresentations made to plaintiffs.

The trial court

found that the value of the consideration given to defendants
by plaintiffs was the sum of $15,000.
All of the Court's findings are supported by admissible, competent evidence.

The record clearly establishes that

the defendants told plaintiffs the property they were to receive was located in a subdivision consisting of 192 lots.
This representation, which the Court believed and accepted as
being true, was relied upon by the plaintiffs in deciding to
accept the agreement with the defendants.

Defendants delivered

a subdivision map to plaintiffs showing 192 lots and indicating
that certain of the lots were being reserved for commercial
purposes, and inferring, if not stating, that the balance of
the lots was being offered for sale, exchange or other disposition.

This evidence, and the trial court's findings and con-

clusions based thereon, must stand, even though the record contains conflicting testimony on the part of the defendants.

It

is within the province of the trial court to find the facts in
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(13)

the face of conflicting evidence.

Mccarren v. Merrill, 15 U.2d

179, 389 P.2d 732 (1964), where the supreme Court stated:
The resolution of the dispute in this case is
governed by the old and oft repeated rule that where
the evidence is in conflict, it is the trial court's
prerogative to believe that which he finds more convincing, in that his findings will not be disturbed on
appeal so long as there is some substantial evidence
to support them. See Malstrom v. Consolidated Theaters, 4 U.2d 181, 290 P.2d 689.
Contrary to the assertion of appellants, the Act does
not require the disposition of ten units.

"Subdivision" and

"subdivided lands" include any land divided or proposed to be
divided for the purpose of disposition into ten or more units.
The record abundantly reflects the defendants' representations
that there was a subdivision upon which there were to be certain improvements.

The defendants delivered a map to plain-

tiffs showing the subdivision and layout of lots or units.
Further, defendants made four conveyances of portions of the
subdivision within a six-month period.

All of this evidence is

more than sufficient to sustain the trial court's Findings and
Conclusions, notwithstanding defendants' assertion that the
proposal to subdivide had been abandoned.
Defendants rely on certain exemptions in the Act.

The

reliance is unfounded.
The definitions of "disposition" and "offer" in the
Act refer to transactions or solicitations, "if undertaken for
gain or profit."

At least two of the conveyances made by In-

ternational Equities, Inc. were for gain or profit.

(14)

Interna-
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tional Equities, Inc. claims that the other two were not for
gain or profit, having been transactions with related companies.
Appellants rely on the exemption of Section 57-114 (l) (a).

That exemption provides that the Act does not apply

to offers or dispositions of an interest in land "by a purchaser of subdivided lands for his own account in a single or
isolated transaction."

That exemption contemplates a purchaser

of subdivided lands making a subsequent sale for his own account in a single or isolated transaction.

In this case, that

exemption would apply if the Wallises were making an offer or
disposition of an interest in subdivided land for their own
account, in a single or isolated transaction.

It does not ap-

ply to the subdivider or promoter of subdivided lands.
Appellants rely upon the exemption provided in Section
57-11-4(1) (c).

The Act does not apply to offers or disposi-

tions of an interest in land "to any person who acquires that
interest for use in the business of constructing residential,
commercial or industrial buildings; or to any person who acquires that type of land for the purpose of disposition to a
person engaged in such business • • • "

Appellants mischarac-

terize the evidence regarding plaintiffs' intentions for constructing buildings upon the property.

Plaintiffs discussed be-

tween themselves that someday they might build homes upon the
property (R. 625), although plaintiffs had made no decision or
commitment regarding construction of homes on the property
841).

(Re

In addition, plaintiffs are not in the business of con-

structing residential, commercial or industrial buildings, alSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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though Mr. Wallis has been employed by a company in the business of making improvements upon existing buildings.

It is

clear that the property was not received by the Wallises solely
for the purpose of constructing buildings thereon for resale.
Finally, appellants rely on the exemption of Section
57-11-4(2) (e).

That section provides that the Act does not

apply to "offers or dispositions of any interest in oil, gas,
or other minerals or other royalty interests therein if the
offers or dispositions of those interests are regulated as securities by United States or by the securities commission of
this state." (Emphasis added.)

There was no evidence or testi-

mony before the Court that the oil, gas or mineral interests
conveyed by International Equities, Inc. are regulated as securities by the United States or by the securities commission
of Utah, and if so regulated, the exemption suggests that such
regulation must be pursuant to registration with the federal or
state securities commission.

There is no evidence before the

Court either that those interests are regulated or, if regulated, that International Equities, Inc. had registered the
interests or were exempt from such registration.
In conclusion, the exemptions cited by appellants are
inapplicable.
The evidence, and the trial court's Findings and Conclusion, require the affirming of the judgment against appellants.
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POINT II.

THE COURT'S FINDINGS, AND THE EVIDENCE IN THE
CASE, ARE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FRAUD AGAINST
THE DEFENDANTS.
The trial court was concerned with a possible double

recovery in the event it awarded judgment for plaintiffs on
their second cause of action.

At the conclusion of the plain-

tiffs' case, appellants made a motion to dismiss and asked the
Court to require plaintiffs to elect its remedies under the
fraud or Utah Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.

Plaintiffs

cited to the Court the case of Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602
(Utah 1974), which plaintiffs read as standing for the proposition that where a statute provides remedies and specifically
provides that such remedies are in addition to other available
remedies, judgment may be entered and damages assessed as to
both (remedies under the statute and the other available remedies).

The discussion among the Court and counsel regarding

this issue is contained in pages 745-8 of the record, and set
forth as Exhibit E to the Appendix for the Court's convenience.
While plaintiffs do not argue the point that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more
than once, the Court's Findings and Conclusions sufficiently
support a finding in fraud.

The Court did not enter specific-

ally findings of fraud as to the second cause of action so that
plaintiffs could not obtain a double recovery.

Plaintiffs have

never and do not now seek a double recovery, but only what they
are entitled to under their fraud cause of action or the Utah
Uniform Land Sales Practices Act.

Appellants would attempt to

have this Court reverse the trial court's decision on the Land
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Sales Practices Act, reverse the trial court and hold that the
plaintiffs' claims of fraud are dismissed with prejudice, and
leave plaintiffs with nothing after having proved their case as
to both causes of action.

If for any reason the award under

the Land Sales Practices Act is reversed, judgment should be
entered for plaintiffs on the basis of fraud.
POINT III.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR ATTORNEY'S FEES
ON APPEAL.

Section 57-11-17(2) of the Act provides in pertinent
part as follows:
In addition to any other remedies, the purchaser,
under subsection (l} may recover the consideration paid for the unit together with interest at
the rate of seven percent per year from the date
of payment, property taxes paid, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees, • • •
Until recently, the rule of this Court was that attorney's fees on appeal are discretionary with the Court.

Swain

v. Salt Lake Real Estate & Investment Co., 3 U.2d 121, 279 P.2d
709 (1955); see also Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (1977}.

In

the recent case of Management Services Corp. v. Development
Associates, No. 16341, filed September 11, 1980, this Court
adopted the rule of law that "a provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees incurred by
the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to enforce the contract •

. . ."

Plaintiffs

submit that the Management Services Corp. case impliedly applies to a statutory provision authorizing the award of attorney's fees incurred in enforcing the statute to also include
those attorney's fees incurred on appeal.
(18)

Drawing upon the
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language of Zambruk v. Perlnutter Third General Builders, Inc.,
510 P.2d 472 (Colo.App. 1973), cited by this Court in Management Services Corp., the prevailing party awarded attorney's
fees pursuant to enforcement of a statutory provision should be
enabled to recover the full amount authorized by the statute,
including fees incurred on appeal, so as not to diminish the
amounts authorized by the statutory remedy.
stated in the case of Stafford

Vo

This policy is

Carmann, 577 P.2d 836 (Kan.

App. 1978) :

The final point on appeal involves the plaintiff's cross-appeal requesting that additional attorney's fees be allowed for the appeal. While K.S.A.
60-2006 does not expressly authorize the award of fees
for an appeal, inherent in its meaning is the concept
that attorney's fees should be awarded for all services rendered for the benefit of the one who proceeds
under the provisions of the section. Furthermore, the
allowance of attorney's fees for an appeal effectuates
the policy behind the statute, • • •
Plaintiff's request that this Court adopt the rule of Management Services Corp. and apply it to statutes which authorize
recovery of attorney's fees to include attorney's fees on appeal.

The case should be remanded to the trial court for de-

termination of the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded
plaintiffs on this appeal.
POINT IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW TRIAL
AFTER THE FIRST TRIAL OF THIS MATTER.
After the first trial, the court granted a new trial

on the basis that "the court committed reversable error [sic]
particularly as it relates to the awarding of attorney's
fees."

After the first trial, the court issued a Memorandum

Decision granting judgment to plaintiffs on their second cause
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of action in the sum of $15,000 plus $3,750 for attorney's
fees.

Thereafter, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiffs

in the sum of $15,000 actual damages and $3,750 punitive damages.

Defendants requested a new trial, primarily on the basis

that the Memorandum Decision had awarded attorney's fees which
are not authorized in a fraud action, rather than punitive
damages.

In response, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend and

enter judgment which provided in pertinent part as follows:
Defendant's motion for a new trial and the
Court's Memorandum Order of August 6, 1979, addressed
the issue of an award of attorney's fees for punitive
damages. If the Court determines that the punitive
damages awarded are improper or excessive, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment should
be modified accordingly. If necessary, consistent
with the provisions of Rule 59(a), the court should
open the judgment, take additional testimony, amend
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and direct
the entry of a new judgment.
Upon amendment of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, consistent with the Court's
order regarding attorney's fees or punitive damages,
any defects related thereto would be cured. Rule 61
provides that "the Court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any error or defect in the
proceedings which does not affect the substantial
rights of the parties."
The parties have had their day in court and are
entitled to entry of a judgment which is consistent
with the evidence presented at said trial. Substantial justice may be achieved by amending the Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in accordance
with the Court's order. Substantial prejudice, delay
and expense will result if a new trial is required.
(R. 179-80)
While the granting or refusing of a motion for a new trial is a
discretionary matter with the trial court, where the case is
tried to the court and an error may be cured by the court by
modifying Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, it
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is an abuse of discretion not to so amend and to enter the
order granting a new trial.

See Rules 59(a) and 61.

Where the parties have had an opportunity to fully and
completely present their cases to the court, and where the
judgment is in accordance with the evidence produced, it is an
abuse of discretion to grant a new trial.

See Uptown Appliance

and Radio Co. v. Flint, 249 P.2d 826 (Utah 1952).
Defendants' motion for a new trial, including the affidavit which formed a part thereof, did not raise any of the
grounds required by Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, although it referred to Subdivisions (1), (5), (6) and
(7).

The trial court has no discretion to grant a new trial

absent showing one of the grounds specified in Rule 59.

Tan-

gero v. Marrero, 13 U.2d 290, 373 P.2d 390 (1962).
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed and
plaintiff allowed its attorney's fees on this appeal.
DATED this

day of November, 19805
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

Wayne G. Petty
Attorney for Plaintiff
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the
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two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents were mailed, postage prepaid to the following:

Ronald c. Barker
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
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,
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for defendants
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone 486-9636
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
---00000---

WALTER WALLIS and MARLEEN
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

H. E. THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
WALTER WALLIS and MARLEEN
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs,
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

vs.

H. E. THOMAS, et al.,

Civil No. 239555_& 233143

Defendants.
)
---00000---

Come now the defendants H. E. Thomas and International
Equities, Inc. and move the Court, pursuant to the provisions of·
Rule 59(a)(l), (5), (6) and (7), URCP, for a new trial in the
above-entitled matter.

The affidavit of H. E. Thomas in support

of this motion is filed herewith.

This motion is based in part

upon the provisions of 78-7-25, UCA, 1953, Article I, §7 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, and similar provisions in
the Federal Constitution.
Defendants allege that by reason of the long period
of time which passed between the date of trial and the rendering
of a decision by the Court, that he was deprived of his right to
a fair trial and to due process.
Further, the findings, conclusions and judgment as
entered in this matter are not consistent with the memorandum
decision of the Court, the Court having awarded attorney fees
under circumstances where the law does not permit the award of
attorney fees, and counsel for plaintiffs having thereafter
and without hearing presented findings and judgment purporting
to Quinney
convert
said Funding
attorney
fees provided
into punitive
judgment
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is contrary to and is not supported by the evidence or the law
and should be vacated and set aside in the interests of justice.
Dated the

;t_

day of

/i

/

Rona d C. Barker, attorney for
defendants H. E. Thomas and International
Equities, Inc., 2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115, telephone
486-9636
STATE OF UTAH
SS.

County of Salt Lake)
H. E. THOMAS, being first duly sworn, on his oath
deposes and says that this affidavit is filed on behalf of
himself and on behalf of the defendant International Equities,
Inc.;

that the following statements are true of his own

knowledge except for statements made on information and belief
and as to each of those statements he believes them to be true:
1.

That this matter was tried to the Court setting

without a jury on the
2.

~1_3_th~~--~

day of December, 1977.

That the Court took the matter under advisement

at the conclusion of the trial, and thereafter on or about the
day of

--------~·

1979, by memorandum decision, awarded

judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against these defendants on
the

second

claim for relief in plaintiffs' complaint.

Said

memorandum decision, a copy of which is annexed hereto as exhibit
"A", awarded attorney fees to plaintiffs.
said judgment was

a~arded

The claim under which

is a tort claim and Affiant believes

that the law does not allow the award of attorney fees in a tort
claim.
3.

Thereafter Affiant received from his attorney a copy

of findings, conclusions and judgment prepared by counsel for
plaintiff wherein the Court awards yunitive damages in the same
amount as had been specified in the memorandum decision as
attorney fees, whereas the memorandum decision did not provide
for punitive damages.
4.

Affiant believes that after the long period of

time which passed between the trial of this matter and the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
2 Library Services and Technology Act, -administered
by the Utah State Library.
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Memorandum Decision by the Court, that the Court had forgotten
a substantial part of the testimony and evidence adduced by
the parties and accordingly that the defendants have been
deprived of their right to a fair trial, to have the case
decided on the basis of testimony and evidence adduced at the
trial, and that the judgment deprives

~hem

of their property

without due process of law.
5.

Affiant believes that the plaintiffs failed to

prove their claim against the defendants by a preponderance
of the evidence, and that the proof was not made by clear and
convincing proof as required in a fraud case.
Dated the

.;2._

J~~------

day of
H.

~

Subscribed and sworn to before me the '2-~ day of
June, 1979.

rf2-c

~

katarY=.~n~:t

Salt Lake

City, Utah

My commission expires: I "2-- -

2- (;"

-rf"'"c

I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing
to be mailed, postage prepaid, the
day of June, 1979, to
Wayne G. Petty, attorney for plaint~ 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111 .

.··~~e_~_,,,A

~ C.

Barker

~-
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

WALTER WALLIS and MARLEEN
WALLIS,
Civil No. 239555

Plaintiffs,
vs.

MOTION TO AMEND AND
ENTER JUDGMENT

H. E. THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
WALTER WALLIS and MARLEEN
WALLIS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 233143

H. E. THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
---0000000--

Plaintiffs Walter Wallis and Marleen Wallis move
the Court, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59 and Rule 61,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to amend and enter judgment
in favor of plaintiffs based upon the Court's memorandum order
of August 6, 1979.
Defendants' motion for a new trial and the Court's
memorandum order of August 6, 1979, address the issue of an
award of attorney's fees or punitive damages.

If the Court

determines that the punitive damages awarded are improper or
excessive, the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment should be modified accordingly.

If necessary, consistent
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with the provisions of Rule 59(a), the Court should open
the judgment, take additional testimony, amend findings of
fact and conclusions of law, and direct the entry of a new
judgment.
Upon amendment of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, consistent with the Court's order
regarding attorney's· fees or punitive damages, any defects
related thereto would be cured.

Rule 61 provides that "the

Court at every stage of the proceedings must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties."
The

p~rties

have had their day in court and are

entitled to entry of a judgment which is consistent with
the evidence presented at said trial.

Substantial justice

may be achieved by amending the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment in accordance with the Court's order.
Substantial prejudice, delay and expense will result if a new
trial is required.
DATED this

~day

of August, 1979.
MOYLE & DRAPER

Mailed a copy of the· foregoing Motion to Ronald C.
Barker, attorney for defendants, 2870 South State Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this

~

day of August, 1979.

~~-~
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Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for defendants
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Telephone: 486-9636
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
---00000---

WALTER WALLIS, et ux.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
Civil No. 239555

H.E. THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING NEW TRIAL
WALTER WALLIS, et ux.,
)

Plaintiffs,
)

vs.

Civil No.

z3Ji~
-~

H.E. THOMAS, et al.,
Defendants.
)
---00000---

Defendants' motion for a new trial in the aboveentitled matters came on for a special hearing at the hour
of 1:30 p.m. on the 9th day of July, 1979, before the Honorable
Peter F. Leary, District Judge, with Wayne G. Petty appearing
as counsel for plaintiffs and Ronald C. Barker appearing as
counsel for defendants.

Oral arguments were made by res-

pective counsel and the matter was taken under advisement by
the Court.

It appearing to the Court that the Court committed

reversable err particularly as it relates to the awarding
of attorney fees, and good cause appearing therefor, it is
hereby
ORDERED, as follows:
1.

That defendants' motion for a new trial is

hereby granted.
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2.

The judgement heretofore entered in this

matter in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants is
hereby vacated and set aside.
3.

The Clerk's Office is directed to put this

matter on the trial calandar for an expedited trial setting.
Dated the ~ay of August, 1 79.

•

1

Approved as to Form:

w:ie~~4$=

Attorney for Plaintiffs

?-o~ t-M
Ronald C. Barker
Attorney for Defendants

- 2 -
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THE COURT:

3

is smiling and the

.i

of us are going to be Eurprisec

5

I apparently don't know it.

6

I

~my

Well, the

1.;a~ 7 ~·-::.

Ear:<er

I am f::-o·wni-::.g, one or otlier or 1::c·:t
'~y ~,,,hat

MR. PETTY:

the la.";.,"

i~,

'.~ecau~e

Well, it surprised ne too.

Let me tell you what I understand the law to be and cite

8

where I get my understanding.

9

Sales Practices Act subsection 2 says, "In addition to any

10

other remedies, the purchaEers, under

ll

..
recover the consideration paid for the unit tcgether with

12

interest at the rate of 7 percent per year . . . " and

13

on,

I!

14

Section 57-11-17 of the Land

~ubsection

(1) may

20

. and attorney's fees."
In the case of Lamb vs. Bangart there was a similar -

15

MR. BARKER:

16

MR. PETTY:

Yes, excuse rr.e.

18

THE COURT:

Is that a Utah citation?

19

MR5 PETTY:

It is a Utah case, 1974 case.

17

It is

525 Pac. 2d. 602.

20

21

Do you have a citation?

In that case the Supreme Court referred to Section

7A-2-721.

That would be in the Commercial Code.

22

MR. BARKER:

2.3

MR. PETTY:

7A-2-721?
Yes.

"Remedies for material

24

misrepresentation or fraud include all remedies available

25

under this chapter for nonfraudulent breach.

26

rescission or a claim for rescission of the contract for

27

sale nor rejection or return of the goods shall bar or be

28

deemed inconsistent with a claim for damages.rr

29

think that should be, "or other remedy."

30

Neither

It says--I

Then the opinion says, "In the instant action, in
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~dd1tion

~o

t~e~~

ueing no provision that Paragraph

?rovided :::-:.e 2:zcL13ive reme:iy, a contract
3
.i

5
6

7
8

9
10

~iacilit:r

C.oes not

·.;:_1:._
per:-::~t

:~::>:

~lause

limiting

-=e applied i:1 a :Eraud action.

The law

a covenant cf i:nr..unity which

~.;ill

a person against his own fraud on the ground of
policy.

~

A contract limitation on damages or

protect

publ~c

ra~edies

is

valid only in the absence of allegations or proof of fraud.
Defendants claim that plaintiffs received a duplicate
recovery, since they were given an award for a breach of
contract concerning the warranty that the bull was a breeder

ll

without having paid the full purchase price or acquiring the

12

full interest for which damages were awarded.

13

claim that they were entitled to an offset for the unpaid

14

purchase price or the Jury should have been instructed to

15
16

consider this fact in assessing damages."

Defendants

I can read the

rest but--

17

THE COURT: Well, I can't tell from what

18

you are reading whether the trial court awarded judgment

19

on two different theories in that case.

20

bring theme

21

but when we get down to some point, maybe we are not there

22

yet, I am not Eure, but sooner or later I don't think I

2.3

could enter a judgment on the first cause of action and then

24

turn right around and enter a judgment on the second cause

25

of action.

26

There is no question

MR. PETTY:

ab~ut

True you could
alternative relief,

That's the way I read Lamb

.,.....

vs. Bangart and there is a dissenting case, Your Honor, by

28

Justice Ellett and Justice Ellett says you can't do both.

29

That is specifically his dissent.

30

THE COURT:

In the dissent he says you
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3
.i

.vn
. a\. • PETTY·.
can'~

is a

:!o both.
~~=ee

rrt..
.J.. i.l.

at

1

c
~

r ~~·n~
J.. 6

1 1- •

i~

The majority, there being

. . .

to two c.cci.s:.on, it is.

J~stice C~OC~2tt

5

in Judge Ellett's view.

6

the majority held that the award could be on

7

In other words, in view--

8
9

looks lL..:e it

It was a three to

t~o

28IlCU~~~

iecision and

~oth

claiffis.

THE COURT:

You don't collect twice, do

MRe PETTY:

That is the result in a

you?

10
ll

fraud case.

12

judgment, under the statutory relief and you may in addition

13

to that be awarded relief on the fraud.

14

as I read it.

Under the statutory you may

15

~Je

awarded the

That's the case

I frankly was surprised.

THE COURT:

What you are suggesting then

16

is that I should award you $15,000 plus 7 percent interest

17

plus

18

another $15,000 and 20,000 punitive on the second?

19

MR. PETTY:

20

stands for the proposition that can be the result.

at~orney's

21

fees on the first cause of action.

And

I am saying Lamb vs. Bangart

THE COURT: Well, I will read it but I

22

don't think that would be an equitable result even in view

23

of if there is the worst kind of fraud·.

24

25

MR. PETTY:

I am arguing what the case stands for.

26
?_,..

28

THE COURT:

Well, I will read it.

Could

you give me either the Utah citation or let me take your
copy of it?
MR. PETTY:

29

30

I am not arguing the equities

certainly.

Yes, you may take this copy,

I think there may be another case attached to
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2

THE COURT:

You can argue ·.;our motion

to dismiss the second cause, Mr. Barker.

3

MR. BARKER:

Than~

you.

Ar.d as

5

Court observed the motion to require an election is still

6

under consideration by the Court?

-.

THE COURT: Well, there is one on file .
I understand that.

8

MR. BARKER:

9

May I say something

10

further about the first cause before we leave that, Your

11

Honor?

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. BARKER:

All right.
Calling attention to

14

57-11-2, subsection 6 which has been read before, it says,

15

"Subdivision and subdivided lands means any land which is

16

divided .

17

divided..

18

certainly isn't so.

19

statute.

"

Now, the evidence is this land was not

There was no subdivision recorded.

It doesn't come within that part of the

MR . PETTY:

20

So that part

It says, "Or is proposed to

be subdivided--", "proposed to be divided . . . "

21

MR. BARKER:

22

"Proposed to be divided for
JI

~

the purpose of disposition into ten or more units

24

Now, that doesn't say

25

to be proposed to be subdivided into ten units.

26

an actual proposed subdividing into ten or more units.

27

Now, there is no evidence of that.

th~t

someone misrepresented it was going
It talks of

The most that

28

can be said for their evidence is that if it is believed there

29

was misrepresentation as. to what the intent was, a misrepresen a-

w

tion doesn't come within the definition of that statute.
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